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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SUPREME COURT REviEw. Philip B. Kurland, Editor. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. ix. 326. Seven essays on subjects involving
as many different areas of the law have been placed between hard covers and offered
to the public as the first volume of what is intended to be a series of annual publications concerning the work of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
editor in his brief preface points out the unique character of the undertaking,
namely, a publication devoted exclusively to the presentation of sustained, disinterested, and competent criticism of the professional qualities of the Supreme
Court's opinions. As the editor notes, the need for such criticism has been expressed
by Professor Henry Hart and the desirability of, even the necessity for, such criticisrft has been announced by members of the Court themselves. The editor, contributors, .and all others responsible for the appearance of this sorely needed annual
review have put not only the legal profession but all citizens of the United States
in their debt. One can easily imagine the great benefits that might have accrued
to all of us had a publication of this sort been in existence in 1954, for example:
The legal profession and the people generally are to this day not clear about the
great decision of that year concerning segregation in the schools. Perhaps it would
be advisable for the future issues of the review to be open for the consideration
of important decisions of the past which are still a matter of lively interest and
controversy.
Although the review is issued under the auspices of the University of Chicago
Law School, most of the contributors to the first issue are not members of the faculty
of that school. Presumably the best essays are to be selected regardless of academic
geography. The first three essays deal with constitutional questions raised in recent
cases. Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.'s brilliant article on the law of obscenity is the
first of these. In it he examines recent opinions (that is, in cases from 1957 to 1959),
as well as earlier ones. It is to be hoped that in a future issue he will bring his great
learning and discernment to bear on a criticism of the Court's decision of January
23, 1961, on the validity of the Chicago film censorship law. 2 The value of the
present essay is not impaired by reason of the January decision. It remains required
reading for all lawyers who are involved in problems of the law of obscenity.
Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr.3 contributes the second article, which is devoted
to a discussion of rights under the fourth amendment. This essay is occasioned by
six cases decided during the 1959 term. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is the
Elkins case4 in which the Court repudiated the silver platter doctrine; articles obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, without
involvement of federal officers, may no longer be introduced in evidence against a
defendant over his timely objection in a federal criminal trial. Professor Barrett's
concern, however, is with the thesis that the Court in applying the fourth amendment "has unintentionally created a situation in which concern with protecting the
rights of those charged with crime has resulted in extending greater protection to
property interests than to personal liberty." 5 This thesis he has thoroughly substantiated and what he has done is an admirable example of first-class professional
criticism of the course of decision in fourth amendment cases.
The third article, the contribution of Professor Kenneth L. Karst," is a thoughtful plea for more knowledge and less hunch concerning what he terms (following
the lead of Professor Kenneth C. Davis, whose Administrative Law Treatise he
cites) "legislative facts." He states that "the court's legislative function. requires
1 Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2 Times Films, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 81 S. Ct. 391 (1961), noted at 36 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 406 (1961).
3 Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
4 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
5 Text at 49.
6 Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University.

447

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
it to be informed on matters far beyond the facts of the particular case.' 7 And he
continues: "These 'legislative facts' of broader application need illumination so that
the court can make the best possible prediction of the effects of its decision.""
Professor Karst discusses many recent cases in the light of an argument for what he
calls particularity. This reviewer has the feeling that the article would be more
illuminating to the profession if more time and space had been available to the
author.
The remaining four articles deal with matters of great importance, no doubt,
but of much more specialized interest than the first three. In the field of labor law
Professor Bernard D. Meltzer's 9 elaborate analysis of the Chicago & Northwestern
case' ° points out deficiencies in the Court's treatment and advances explanations
for such deficiencies. In the field of admiralty jurisdiction, Mr. David P. Currieexposes the difficulties in applying or rejecting, as the case may be, provisions of
state law in cases involving injuries occurring on navigable waters. Mr. Currie
begins his discussion with a treatment of Hess v. United States,12 decided in the
1959 term. He then convincingly demonstrates that the present state of the law
concerning the application of state law in admiralty cases is "the devil's own mess."' 3
And he concludes with some suggestions for improvement.
In the field of federal taxation, Professor Charles L. B. Lowndes 4 propounds
the thesis: "It is time to rescue the Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time
to rescue federal taxation from the Supreme Court."' 5 To this reviewer Professor
Lowndes' article is by far the best in the entire volume. At the outset he states the
thesis previously quoted. He lucidly explains what the Court has done badly in
federal tax cases and suggests that it be relieved of jurisdiction of those cases except
those that involve constitutional questions or criminal prosecutions. Whether one
agrees with his conclusions or not, one must acknowledge that his argument has
great force and that he has stated it admirably.
Finally, in the field of antitrust law, Dean Edward H. Levi 16 writes on United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co.' 7 The facts of this case, involving resale price maintenance, are set forth at length and the various opinions carefully analyzed and compared with prior related decisions. Dean Levi concludes that "it is a matter of
concern that the law should have failed to provide itself with a meaningful structure
of theory""' in the matter of the price-control problem, but there is hope "that a
future case will make of Parke, Davis an important step' 9 in the development of
such a structure.
The usefulness of the volume would be greatly enhanced if it were provided
with an index and table of cases. Perhaps future issues will be equipped with such
traditional aids. But, just as it stands, The Supreme Court Review should be
accorded a warm welcome by the profession. May the project begun with such a
high degree of accomplishment continue ad multos annos.
Roger Paul Peters*
7 Text at 77.
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Ibid.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
362 U.S. 330 (1960).
Law clerk at the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
361 U.S. 314 (1960).
Text at 158.
Professor of Law, Duke University.
Text at 222.
Dean of the Law School and Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
362 U.S. 29 (1960), noted at 36 NOTR- DAME LAWYER 81 (1960).
Text at 326.
Ibid.
B.A., LL.B.; Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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FREEDOM AND CMLIZATION. By Bronislaw Malinowski. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 338. $2.25. This is a paperback edition of
a work originally published posthumously in 1944. It was written while the author
was teaching at Yale University during the early years of World War II and was
motivated by a desire to clarify on anthropological grounds both the issues of the
war and the problems in finding peace which the democratic powers would face
when the war was over. Malinowski's method was an exploration of "Freedom"
and his thesis was that "freedom, justice and democracy supply the best conditions
for sound cultural development."
As a cultural anthropologist, Malinowski's first concern was to define and describe the significance of human freedom as it influenced human action in a social
and cultural context. Culture and freedom are each the cause and effect of the
other, he said. On the one hand, culture is said to be "the real context in which
human freedom is born and by which it is specifically limited."' But, on the other
hand: "Culture is the gift of freedom."12 Generically, freedom is understood as "the
conditions necessary and sufficient for the effective run of any process or any activity."3 But, culturally, freedom is defined by "those cultural conditions under
their purposes, execute them efficiently and reap
which human beings can mature
'4
the benefits of their labors.
Malinowski saw freedom in a social and technical context. It was to him an
objective attribute of human action and not a subjective feeling. Nor was it a
purely individualistic thing: "It implies the benefit from action and responsibility
for action by individuals and groups alike." 5 What distinguishes his alproach from
the usual philosophical and political discussion of the concept is that he is particularly concerned with the natural and cultural conditions of human freedom in an
effective, existential context. As he understood it, human freedom is not something
absolute and indeterminate but is, on the contrary, both relative and predetermined.
Freedom is thus always freedom under law or discipline, whether the controlling force is the law of nature or the law of society. And, since freedom is not
defined in an individualistic context, what distinguishes it -from tyranny and slavery
is not the absence of restraint, but rather the presence or absence of abuse of power
and authority. If power is exercised by those in authority so as to prevent their
subjects from full participation in the planning, execution and enjoyment of their
labors, the result is tyranny. What he was most concerned to avoid was a concept
of freedom which equated it with an absence of authority. Effective freedom, according to Malinowski, was always subject to the authority and discipline of the
institutions of society. In the anthropological context, human culture is an instrument of human power; it is designed to preserve human life and to increase the
dimensions of human freedom.
Malinowski was perhaps writing more of what culture ought to do than what
it does. He may be criticized for failing to distinguish clearly between the normative, ideal functions of culture, and its actual, historical functions. He would, perhaps, have agreed that the distinction has importance if culture is to be defined in
terms of institutions which satisfy human needs and promote human freedom. The
notion of the dysfunctions of cultural institutions was implicitly recognized in this
work - especially in his uncompromising criticism of the totalitarian political system- but he did not appreciate sufficiently in theory the role of normative ideals
and creative individuals in transcending the given, historical and cultural values
of their generations and opening up new perspectives of freedom.

1
2
3
4
5

Text at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 95.
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Nevertheless, Malinowski's effort remains the most comprehensive and acute
analysis of the concept of freedom in modem anthropological literature. It is a
book full of brilliant insights, insights which often surpass the rigid formulas the
author proposes in the name of objective, behavioral science.
David Bidney*
BobbsFEDERAL TAX FRAUD LAw. By Ernest R. Mortenson. Indianapolis:
Merrill Co., Inc., 1958. Pp. vii, 312. $12.50. As enforcement of the federal tax
laws is intensified, a higher percentage of taxpayers will be brought within the tax
fraud net. President Kennedy's recent request for a substantially greater number
of enforcement personnel, notably more special (or fraud) agents, than were provided for in the last Eisenhower budget, presages sharply stepped-up investigative
activity. Fraud cases already represent an important segment of tax practice;
stepped-up investigations of tax returns will increase their importabce.
Mr. Mortenson's book, therefore, will likewise increase in its vitality. As a
former government tax official and later a private practitioner, he obviously brings
to his subject a well-rounded background in the field. He has been able to translate this knowledge into trenchant, penetrating prose which illuminates his subject
with real clarity. He has succeeded in making understandable an area of tax
practice which is frequently quite difficult to document.
At the outset, the author includes an excellent introductory chapter which
sets the stage for the more detailed development to follow. This introduction is
virtually a capsule summary of the entire work. It will be most valuable as a quick
reference to many points when time does not permit lengthier study. It is also a
handy refresher.
This excellent introduction is followed by an enlightening step-by-step analysis,
The Evolution of a Tax Fraud Case. Here the experienced background of the
writer is most evident in his intensely practical approach to and explanations of
"twilight zones." Such matters as "right to copy of transcript," "representation by
counsel," "conference with the special agent," and "informers" are explained as
only an accomplished veteran could explain them. Apt citations of authority are
included to all such points that have been considered by the courts. One trouble
in this area is that many trenchant questions have never been considered by the
courts. This is just where the superior personal knowledge and experience of the
author fills the void.
An extremely helpful aspect of this chapter, and of the entire book as well,
is the use of those documents which will be confronted in tax fraud cases. An
example is the letter directed to taxpayers who have failed to keep sufficient records
as required by the tax laws. To see a reproduction of the document should prove
a boon to the practitioner who must deal with it in a future case.
After discussing the development of a tax fraud case, a hypothetical case is
followed from beginning to end. All pertinent written data, e.g., the taxpayer's
statement under oath before the Intelligence Division, is reproduced in its entirety.
Even government documents, such as the joint report of the special agent and
revenue agent, with accompanying tax computations, are included. The value of
these reproductions is that the practitioner will know what to expect when he sees
one of them in a future case.
One of the most vexing questions in every tax fraud case is the extent to which
the taxpayer should disclose his records and other evidence to the government
agents. A thorough discussion 'of this problem is contained in chapter 3. The
sensitive perception of the author is exemplified by his keen observation that
Even where the decision is made to cooperate, only in the rarest of circumstances should the taxpayer prepare, or sign a net worth statement
Professor of Anthropology and Philosophy, Indiana University.
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repared by the Government. Such a statement may be the principal evidence leading to ultimate conviction.'

Experience in tax fraud cases proves the solid worth of this statement. Such accurate advice makes this work invaluable for the practitioner, be he general or
specialist.
Claiming the constitutional privileges against self-incrimination, so familiar
to all television viewers, is especally well treated. The reverse, or waiver of these
constitutional privileges, is equally explained and annotated. Much misinformation-is dissipated in these perplexing areas.
Unlike most federal tax matters, fraud may lead to the invoking of criminal
sanctions by the government. The precise statutory provisions for such sanctions
are carefully set forth and explained. Such aspects as "insanity," the "multiplicity
of sanctions," "sanctions for others than taxpayer," and "conspiracy" cover questions that may be seldom met; but can be crucial when they do arise.
One of the chief virtues of this treatise is its repeated emphasis of the vital
theme that, regardless of the prevailing rule of law on the disputed point, the
facts of each case are all-important. A cogent explanation of the use of indirect
evidence points up this justified emphasis. The indirect methods which have been
most frequently employed are (1) net worth increase, (2) expenditures, and (3)
bank deposits. Often a combination is used, or one method may be used to corroborate another. These methods have assumed increasing importance with the
passing years, especially since the Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. United
States.2
If a taxpayer-client should be the object of criminal sanctions, his counsel
must cope with specific evidentiary problems. Here Mr. Mortenson is particularly
effective, because he speaks with the voice of a trial lawyer -there is no substitute
for the crucible test of trial. For example, his discussion of the use of memoranda
by witnesses for the purpose of refreshing recollection is competently handled. This
is an elusive evidentiary area which will be easier to cope with after studying
Chapter VI.
Since criminal sanctions are the most lethal weapon in the government tax
armory, more space is devoted to this subject than to any other. Excellent chapters
on The Framework of a Criminal Tax Trial and Trial of a Criminal Tax Case
are included. At first thought it might appear that a disproportionate portion of
the work is devoted to the criminal trial. When it is realized that the criminal
phase of a tax fraud case dominates all thinking and decisions of counsel until that
phase is concluded, no other phase can be of such transcending importance. Hence,
.Mr. Mortenson's emphasis is not misplaced.
In the final stages, civil penalties and collection procedures are explained. For
those who will not participate in criminal cases, the civil aspects of tax fraud law
will prove vital. The author has not slighted these phases; he has simply subordinated them to the "life or death" aspect of the criminal sanctions.
Mr. Mortenson has achieved the elusive goal of contributing a treatise which
will be of high value to both the specialist in tax law and the general practitioner
who is more rarely called upon to handle a tax fraud case. For the specialist it
may tend to serve more as a check-reference than a source work, but for either
it will be reassuring to have a compact text-reference on the ready shelf.
Testing this work by real life cases reflects its authenticity. It rings true, because the author knows his subject and expresses himself clearly. Many cobwebs
have been swept from obscure corners. Little, if any, fat remains on the sinewy
frame of the text. This is a work which fills a real need in the federal tax library.
Lester M. Ponder*
I Text at 50.
2 348 U.S. 121 (1954).

* B.S., J.D.; member of the Arkansas and Indiana Bars; partner, Barnes, Hickam,
Pantzer & Boyd, Indianapolis.
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WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
PROPOSITION. By John Courtney Murray, S.J.

REFLECTIONS

ON THE AMERICAN

New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.
Pp. xiv, 336. $5.00. Idiomatically speaking, John Courtney Murray, S.J., is "in."
In many quarters he is second only to a fellow Jesuit, the late Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, in the amount of interest and acclaim. Hence, it is possible that his recent
book, We Hold These Truths, will receive a measure of the consideration it deserves.'
Father Murray's appeal is universal, because his thought is not compartmentalized or superficial. For example, whether the emphasis is theological or legal (and
not ruling out a relationship between the two domains), he carries the inquiry
well beyond the traditional borders. Upon the lawyer he presses ultimate questions,
which are more comfortably ignored. And upon the theologian he urges a consideration of practical ramifications which ought not be evaluated solely by means
of deduction from authority. He maintains that "few of the real problems today
are susceptible of solution, or even of statement in legal language. ' 2 Rather, "the
Basic Issues today can only be conceived in metaphysical and theological terms.
They are issues of truth. They concern the nature and structure of reality itself meaning by reality the order of nature as accessible to human reason, and the economy of salvation as disclosed by the Christian revelation." 3 But this ordering results
in no real downgrading of law's importance, as the following will attest:
It is not too much to say that there has been a virtue in the Western
tradition of law which warrants us in calling it redemptive, at least in a
terrestrial sense. Western man has sought in the idea of law a manifold
redemption - from the arbitrary despotisms of uncontrolled power; from
the threat or fact of injustice to his person and to his property; from
dispossession of his human and civil rights; from the degredation that

ensues upon social inequalities destructive of his personal significance and
worth; from the oppressive evils of an inequitable distribution of wealth;
from the multiple rapacities that seem to lurk in the human enterprises of
commerce and trade; from the disruption of life by irrational forces of
passion, caprice, and chance that militate against the "life of expectphrase for the high human good that
ability," to use Sir Ernest Barker's
is guaranteed by the rule of law. 4

Surely this must be ranked among the most eloquent tributes on record.
It is not possible to type this book, any more than it is possible to type Father
Murray. The questions treated cover a wide range, and his approach is expansive.
Actually, many of the essays have been published, as single items, before. And while
each bears a relationship to the others, the end product does not form a completed
whole. Nor, I dare say, did Father Murray intend that it should. For he asks as
many questions as he undertakes to answer. This book, then, is a beginning, not
an end. One hopes that a substantial part of the future elaboration will come from
his own pen.
In times of crisis men turn more readily to an investigation of fundamentals.
Even self-examination may come into vogue. So, today, Americans are discussing,
with a sense of urgency, national "purpose" and "goals." The importance of these
efforts can scarcely be underestimated. Father Murray puts the case with characteristic directness:
What is at stake is America's understanding of itself. Self understanding
is the necessary condition of a sense of self-identity and self-confidence,

whether in the case of an individual or in the case of a people. If the

American people can no longer base this sense on. naive assumptions

1 Father Murray was recently given the cover story treatment by Time magazine. The
author of the article said it was "the most relentlessly intellectual cover story I've ever done"
and made this optimistic prediction: "In the months to come, serious Americans of all sorts
will
and conditions - in pin-stripes and laboratory gowns, space suits and housecoats be discussing his hopes and fears for American democracy." Time, December 12, 1960, pp.
13, 64.

2 Text at 199.
3 Ibid.

4

Text at 155.
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of self-evidence, it is imperative that they find other more reasoned grounds
for their essential affirmation that they are uniquely a people, uniquely
a free society. Otherwise the peril is great. The complete loss of ones
identity is, with all propriety of theological definition, hell. In diminished
forms it is insanity. And it would not be well for the American giant to
go lumbering about the world today, lost and mad.5

In these reflections the author does not advance novel doctrine. On the contrary, he establishes an essential continuity between the truths we hold as a nation
and those which animated the Western tradition. Thus, the familiar principles of
limited government, such as constitutionalism (government under the rule of law),
inalienable and inherent rights of the individual, and consent of the governed (government by the people), are placed in the totality to which they belong. But his
treatment does not amount to a mere restatement or re-presentation. He carefully
examines the American experience, both with a view of showing America's unique
contribution and providing a guide for future action. This is capped by a forthright
consideration of the vexing problem of religious pluralism as it affects civic unity,
which involves, among other things, an analysis of the first two provisions of the
first amendment. 6 His judgment is as significant as it is encouraging. As "articles
of peace," these provisions have stood the test of time, just as good law must. As
he states, "For over a century and a half the United States has displayed to the
world the fact that political unity and stability are not necessarily dependent on the
7
common sharing of one religious faith."1
Moreover,
religion itself, and not the least the Catholic Church has benefited by our
free institutions, by the maintenance, even in exaggerated form, of the
distinction between church and state. Within the same span of history
the experience of the Church elsewhere, especially in Latin lands, has
been alternately an experience of privilege or persecution ....

It would

be difficult to say which experience, privilege or persecution, proved in the
end to be the more damaging or gainful to the Church.8 "
He does not minimize the difficulties which "creeds at war" create, nor does he
entertain great expectations." Still, as difficult as the task may be, unprecedented
effort must be made. As a beginning he suggests: "We could limit the warfare,
and we could enlarge the dialogue. We could lay down our arms (at least the
more barbarous kind of arms!), and we could take up argument."' 0 All in all,
the American experience is a hopeful sign for the future. The more so because of
world-wide implications, since "the quest for unity-amid-pluralism has assumed a
new urgency in the mind of post-modem man.""'
Topics for the dialogue abound. One which Father Murray would place on
the agenda, and thereby put the discussants under severe strain, is what he calls
"the segregationist pattern of American public education."' 2 He is not here referring
to racial segregation in schools, but "the segregation of religion, in the concrete
pluralist sense, from public school premises, and the segregation of the religious
school from public aid."' 3 He protests that the denial of aid to the religious school
does not square with the fact of our pluralist social structure. He does not expect
an early solution of the problem, but does make it clear he believes that, in time,
McCollum v. Board of Education will seem as anachronistic as Plessy v. Ferguson.
Another "unfinished argument" which the author would take up involves the
5 Id. at 5, 6.
6 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7

Text at 72.

8 Id. at 73-74.
9 "My own expectations are modest and minimal. It seems to be the lesson of history
that men are usually governed with little wisdom .... Religious pluralism is against the
will of God. But it is the human condition; it is written into the script of history. It will
not somehow marvelously cease to trouble the City." Id. at 23.
10 Id. at 23.
11 Id. at 133.
12 Id. at 145.
13 Ibid.
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matter of censorship. In a chapter entitled "Should there be a law?" he underscores the limited value of censorship statutes, cautioning against expecting very
much in the way of moral uplift from such laws.1 4 We must resist the temptation
to expect law to accomplish the moralization of society, even though legislation
does seek to secure that end. For, while affirming that law and morality are related,
and that the premises of law are ultimately found in the moral law, he insists law
must not moralize excessively. Otherwise it tends to defeat even its more modest
aims, by bringing itself into contempt. In short, the law is required to be tolerant
of many evils that morality condemns.' 5 However, Father Murray does make positive proposals, both as to the areas of permissible censorship and the procedures to
be followed in exercising this function. His balanced approach stands in sharp
contrast to much "all or nothing" writing on the subject, and, it is hoped, will help
to decrease
heat as it increases the light.
Perhapsthe
the most significant problem which Father Murray addresses involves
the idea of "Christian humanism," or in general, the relationship and attitude of
the Christian to the world. While this may seem to some as no more than an intramural argument, the consequences are very far-reaching indeed. He notes. two
dominant orientations or tendencies. One he calls "eschatological humanism," the
other "incarnational humanism." The first, making a strong appeal to Scripture,
emphasizes man's transcendental goals and thereby encourages an attitude of withdrawal or even "contempt" for the world. Within the earthly City man is a
stranger, a pilgrim, and finds here no abiding home. Aware of sin as a permanent
human fact, he expects little in the way of human progress and achievement. And
affirming the centrality of the Cross, which represents the inversion of all human
values, he is particularly skeptical of "Heaven on Earth" panaceas. 6 But, as Father
Murray points out, the tendency towards an "incarnational humanism is founded
on accents laid on other, and no less Christian, principles."' 7 The end of man is
indeed transcendent, supernatural; but "it is an end of man and in its achievement
man truly finds the perfection of his nature. Grace perfects nature, does not destroy
it-this is the central point of emphasis.""' All that God made is good, and in
the perspectives of incarnational humanism there is a place for all that is natural,
human, terrestrial. Moreover, all things must be restored in .Jesus Christ. A decidedly optimistic view, its spirit can be seen in these words of Cardinal Suhard:
It means that nothing escapes Redemption, that all is washed in His
blood . . . and that henceforth the world is a sign of love. Far from
fleeing it, the Christian has as his task to fulfill it and to assume it....
At the same time his course is laid down and his participation in the
temporal justified. Instead of closing his eyes to progress, the Christian
14

Indeed the whole criminal code is only a minimal moral force. Particularly
in the field of sexual morality the expectations are small; as I have suggested, they are smaller here than anywhere else. It is a sort of paradox,
though an understandable one, that the greater the social evil, the less
effective against it is the instrument of coercive law. Philip Wylie may
have been right in saying that American society "is technically insane
in the matter of sex." If so, it cannot be coerced into sanity by the force
of law. In proportion as literary obscenity is a major social evil, the power
of the police against it is severely limited. Text at 167.
15 Id. at 166.
16
[T]he crucifixion was not only an act in history; it was also the utterance
of a judgment and the promulgation of a law. The law says that he who
would save his life must lose it; the things of this life have their value in
that they provide the material for renouncement. Only through this renouncement, this acceptance -of a similitude of Christ's death, is there
resurrection to the true life. The judgment permanently shatters the
illusion that is nonetheless a permanent temptation of the human spirit
- to want salvation to come here on earth in some manner of new or
renewed "Kingdom of Israel," a realm of peace and plenty, ruled by the
elect of God. Id. at 188.
17 Id. at 189.
18 Ibid.
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believes in it and works for it to fulfill creation and hasten the Second
Coming in which the universe - Mystical Body and all creation - will
produce the triumph of Christ the King by realizing its plenitude and the
achievement of the total Christ. 19
It is the author's view that these two orientations of Christian thought are not
mutually exclusive, but complementary. Yet it requires the best of efforts to construct a synthesis. Fortunately, this problem is engaging the attention of fertile
minds, 20 and one hopes that here, too, Father Murray will in future writings return
to the subject, especially as it relates to American life and institutions.
Much else awaits the reader of this book, such as an incisive chapter on "Doctrine and Policy in Communist Imperialism," and a discussion of the relevance of
natural law to the solution of contemporary problems. Seldom is a publisher given
to understatement, but in this instance Sheed and Ward is certainly justified in
regarding "the publication of this book [as] a significant event in the history of
modem American thought' and in stating that the author treats the areas of concem "with a clarity of thought and sharpness of expression equal to their gravity."
Edward J. Murphy*
A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS. By William 0. Douglas. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. 72. $1.50.
This booklet, which covers ground familiar to lawyers, does not profess
to be a treatise. It states a philosophy or point of view concerning
the
Bill of Rights. It is written in the manner of articles of faith.1
Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court introduces this
terse, little book, which he may proudly add to his repertory of publications. Sometimes great minds reach a quintessence of perfection in the expression of a noble
ideal when they present it in a simple, clear-cut fashion for the average lay reader.
This perfection the author may have reached in this book.
To the legal mind, often cluttered with legal maxims, principles, and complex
analogies, the author, one of the very liberal associate justices on the United States
Supreme Court in the last 20 years, appears to be almost a radical civil libertarian.
Some of his dissenting opinions, which claim that individuals in particular cases
were denied individual rights,2 seem almost to sacrifice the welfare of society for
the preservation of the rights or scruples of one individual. To some extent, this
book will demonstrate that the author still holds fast to his full individual rights
19
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This book originally appeared as a pastoral letter from the late Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris.
Father Murray, writing the Foreword to the present edition (at 9-11), commented:
[It is] a singularly profound statement of the Church's contemporary
mission ....

I should plead, too, for action towards "incarnating"

the

answer [of Cardinal Suhard] in the whole complexus of American religious,
civic, and social life. Here in the United States, too, "the world needs the
Church for its life; the Church needs the world for its growth and fulfillment." . . . We in America have abundantly reaped the seed of Catholic thought and life sown in Europe .... It is our time for sowing, that

others 20
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in Europe and all over the world -

may reap.

A notable example is TEILHARD DR 'CHARDIN, THE DIVINE MnLmru (1960).

B.S., LL.B.; Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant to the Dean, Notre Dame Law

School.
1 Text at 5.
2 E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting at
513-14, declares:
I do not think that the problem can be resolved by the Court's statement
that "obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment" . ..
The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to
preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech
against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech in the preferred
position.
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position.3 But its "articles of faith" seem to point out an underlying philosophy of
the preservation of individual rights for the welfare of the society and for all of
the individuals of that society, not the preservation of individual rights to the detriment of society.
This altruistic, common-good oriented justification for the preservation of an
individual's rights pervades the author's treatment of three fundamental freedoms
"which are often challenged in this tense and complex era."' 4 First treating the
freedom of expression, the author emphasizes that such a freedom makes it possible
for ideas to reach into time and space. The American government "cannot afford
to shackle freedom to think and freedom to speak since these are the mainsprings
of mankind's achievements." 5 In his discussion of this freedom, Mr. Justice Douglas
twice alludes to a passage from John Stuart Mill:
Mill's statement emphasizes that the suppression of an idea is not only a
wrong to the individual who would express it; "it is robbing the human
race." Freedom of expression is a two-sided right. It is a right to speak,
to write, to paint. It is also a right to hear, to read, 6to see, to know.
Communication necessarily involves two or more people.
With regard to freedom of religion and conscience, Mr. Justice Douglas' terseness of expression is rivaled only by the baldness of his social justification for this
freedom:
What a man thinks would not seem to present even a limited possibility
of injury to society. Hence a man's beliefs, his thoughts, should be immune from regulation by governments.7
The author's justification for freedom from discriminatory treatment is probably the most pragmatic of his rationales. Some will not call it an altruistic or
social justification, but rather an egocentric philosophy. Whatever it is, it justifies
an equality under the law that every man will always experience.
No group is immune from the risk of discrimination. Today those
of darker skin - Negroes, Orientals, Italians, Mexicans, Indians - are
most apt to be the victims of prejudice which leads to illegal discrimination. Most of the peoples of the world, however, have yellow,
red, brown, or black skins; and lighter-skinned people may well find themselves at some times and places in the minority. Even in the United States
violent prejudices have broken out against those with white skins who
are Jews, Catholics, Mormons, or Jehovah's Witnesses, or of German,
Italian, Irish, Slavic, or other origin. If we permit government to discriminate against any racial, religious or ethnic group, then any other
group may find itself the victim of the contagion of discrimination. The
only safeguard for each of us lies in full enforcement
of the constitu8
tional command of equality under the law for all.
This booklet does more than display the author's point of view as to each
freedom of the Bill of Rights; it also gives conventional statements of the legal doctrines constituting the Bill of Rights-those freedoms in the federal Constitution
itself and in the amendments thereto. Even its explanation of the "state action"
doctrine," that is, the constitutional view that the guarantees of individual freedoms
3

Text at 38:
But when the inquiry gets into the area of individual beliefs, there is an
invasion of the citizen's right of privacy. Courts then are supposed to
protect the individual from going to jail for contempt when he refuses to
answer. Courts, however, are not always reliable guardians. In 1959, a man
named Uphaus went to prison in New Hampshire for refusing to deliver
to state officials a list of people who attended a conference with him.
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). It was against his "scruples" to do
so. He was not a criminal but a dedicated religious man who believed it
was none of the government's business with whom he had discussions.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 24.
6 Id. at 25.
7 Id. at 30.
8 Id. at 42-43.
9 E.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 242 (1833);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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are what people are entitled to against every governmental action, is forceful. However, Mr. Justice Douglas does not stop there. His book, which is dedicated "To
our high school students from Alaska to Puerto Rico, from Maine to Hawaii," 1 0
has a meaningful message for them about individual liberties which is beyond the
"state action" idea.
[T]he courts and the law can, at best, give only a minimum protection
to our liberties. They can deal, for the most part, only with actions of
government officials. They normally have no authority to protect minority groups and opinions from unpopularity and social ostracism by
private groups. We need a spirit of liberty which extends beyond what a
court can supply, and which accepts in our daily living and behavior
the attitudes of toleration of unorthodox opinions and respect for the
dignity and privacy of each human being, which our Bill of Rights reflects. Our spiritual health depends on our attitudes and habits at the
village and city level and the vigor with which we react to injustices.' 1

With these thoughts, Mr. Justice Douglas expresses a real message for adults as
well as high school students, the American Civil Liberties Union' 2 as well as the
White Citizens' Council. Although the Bill of Rights guarantees fundamental individual freedoms against contrary state action, state action is only the result of the
heartbeat of individual and collective American thoughts, beliefs and actions.
Federal judges have life tenure; and even in states where judges are
elected, they stand out against the popular opinion of the moment to
preserve the enduring principles of our Constitution. But they are able
to do so only because the majority of people in the United States, however much they may disagree with a particular decision, agree with the
basic principles of our written Constitution, including the power which
we give our courts to interpret and enforce it.'1

For the attorney, this booklet may be of little practical significance. But it still
merits recommendation for the appellate attorney's bookshelf, not for the legal and
technical arguments that congest an appellate brief, but for that needed quotation
in the brief or in the policy argument before the appellate tribunal. The "articles of
faith" of the author as to fundamental individual freedoms are clear expressions of
the usually inarticulate and unconscious judgments or policies that lie behind the
logic of a decision in the civil liberties area
For the lay reader, this little book is valuable. It is so not only because of its
information, but because of its challenge' s and its message.
What our Constitution says, what our legislatures do, and what our courts
write are vitally important. But the reality of freedom in our daily lives

10
11

Text at 4.
Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added).

12

See also Book Review, 36 NOTRn DAME LAWYER 239 (1961).

13 Text at 64-65.
14 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 465--66 (1897).
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the
logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose
which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose
is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the
relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root
and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical
form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you
imply? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community
or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because
of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable.., of founding exact
logical conclusions.
15 Text at 4:
Younger citizens, even before they reach college age, need to understand
the way in which our ancient principles are often challenged in this tense
and complex era. They should know how the Bill of Rights is put under
heavy pressures generated by our society. This booklet is designed with
the hope that it will excite interest in the field.
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is shown by the attitudes and policies of people toward each other in the
very block or township where we live. There we will find the real measure
of A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS.16
Thomas M. Clusserath

MR.TuTT AT HIS BEST. By Arthur Train. (Introduction by Judge Harold R.
Medina.) New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1961. Pp. xiii, 357. $4.50. Mr.
Tutt is a lawyer-hero of the old school. Neither an urbane Perry Mason nor a
pragmatic Paul Begler, he is the advocate of another generation, one who makes
his literary mark defending impoverished criminals, destitute widows and friendless
children from the studied malevolence of mortgagees, shysters and policemen. Only
Mr. Tutt could free half a dozen murder defendants (some of doubtful innocence),
defend a horse-thief, litigate two wills, confound three misers, do battle in several
extra-judicial forums, and attend to the romance of Mr. Robert Dingle (the Dingle
Korn Pops heir) and Miss Dizzy Zucker of Mud Island, Maine - all in less than
400 pages.
Tutt & Tutt was the creation of Arthur Train, a New York attorney of the
1920's, who practiced in the urban milieu that surrounds his hero (whenever his
hero is not fishing). Possibly out of dissatisfaction with his geographical environment, Mr. Train invented Pottsville, a rural village that gives Mr. Tutt a place to
fish, meet horse thieves, challenge the avaricious Squire Hezekiah Mason and lend
country color to a character that is too magnificent to be confined to Manhattan.
All of the 15 stories in this book were originally published in The Saturday Evening
Post; they were collected by Judge Medina, who justifies the effort by explaining
that "there is . . . a whole world that is a closed book to a very large segment of
the legal profession."' That is the world of Mr. Tutt, and Judge Medina's effort
is tacitly dedicated to the lawyer he once met, "whose record in MartindaleHubbell's Lawyers Directory was respectable," 2 but who said he had never been
in a criminal court.
Tutt & Tutt are champions of the unattractive; only once in 357 pages does
Mr. Tutt accept a fee. The junior partner, always referred to simply as "Tutt,"
is no relative of Mr. Tutt's, but is in every way the older lawyer's complement.
"Mr. Tutt was the brains and the voice, while Tutt was the eyes and legs of a
combination that at intervals made the law tremble, sometimes in fear and more
often with joy. ' 3 But, partnership or not, Mr. Tutt dominates the stage; and from
his physical description4 to every detail of temperament, he is monumentally flawless. "He went through life with a twinkling eye and a quizzical smile, and when
he did wrong he did it - if such a thing be possible - in a way to make people
better." 5 And when he does battle even his creator cheers from the courtroom bench:
"Will not the gods lend courage and strength to the kindly old lawyer, who never
yet did aught but good, although mayhap he may have done it in queer ways?" 6
A couple of his opponents are as evil as Mr. Tutt is honorable. They are Bloodhound O'Brien, "the yellow dog of the District Attorney's office," and Squire Mason. Mason is merely selfish, but O'Brien is a dedicated scoundrel, "the little czar,
the Pooh-Bah, the high cockalorum of the Sessions."17 He is in league with an
16 Id. at 69.
1 Text at viii.
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 10: "[A] tall, grave, longish-haired lawyer with a frame not unlike that of
Abraham Lincoln, over whose wrinkled face from time to time played the suggestion of a
smile."

5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 99.
7 Id. at 100.
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unscrupulous judge, "the Machiavellian Babson"'; "they were a precious pair of
crooks, who for their own petty and selfish ends played fast and loose with liberty,
life and death." 9
But Mr. Tutt meets other, less culpable opponents. The tarnished criminal
lawyer, for instance, "wasn't no crook, he wasn't! He didn't have to be. He was
just a cog in an immense wheel of crookedness. And when the wheel came down
on his cog, he automatically did his bit."1 0 Abner Pettingill, Esquire, the prosecuting
attorney in Pottsville, is not vicious either, but only "a pale-faced, chinless, pimply
young man, renowned for his elocutionary prowess, with political ambitioni, a
cockatoo's comb and a roving Adam's apple."11 And Judge Philo Utterback Quelch
was at worst the victim "of something about him which made others dislike him
'
more when he was trying to be affable than when he was being frankly nasty.""
Away from the battle, Mr. Tutt is a wise and kindly friend. He keeps two chairs
in his office, one comfortable in an unattractive way, the other with its front legs
shortened by an inch, "in order to make lingering uncomfortable."" The index of
rapport between Mr. Tutt and the visitor to his office is largely a matter of which
chair is indicated. His maxims speak for themselves:
breed dirt....
Now dirt may breed crime, but crime doesn't necessarily
Clothes don't make men; they only make opportunities. 14
Youth is just when it is right; it is cruel when it is wrong; and it is inexorably in any case.... 5 No man is a hero to his children. He has far more
chance with his valet.'
Most men being worse than their lawyers, prefer not to have the latter find
them out.... The law presents sufficiently perplexing problems for the
lawyer without his seeking trouble in the dubious complexities of his client's
morals! 16
The generation receiving Mr. Tutt second-hand may doubt some of his methods.
But, if he drafts a codicil knowing that it will never be valid, and hides his motives
behind lawyer-client privilege, he has, in the process, foiled the designs of a matrimonial adventurer. And, if he abuses process, secrets witnesses and bribes public
and private officials, his design always works as he planned it and always works
victory for the poor and homeless, defeat for the moneyed. That is what Mr. Tutt
is out to do; otherwise, Mr. Train makes abundantly clear, he would be on Wall
Street.
Mr. Train wrote with energy of a lawyer most of today's readers will consider
7
unsophisticated. Not satisfied with maxims, he cites cases' and quotes whole para18
Half of his stories turn on narrow points of
graphs of the New York statutes.
law and fewer than half of them concern jury trial forensics.
The stories of Mr. Tutt pose small challenge to Pickwick and James Gould
Cozzens, but their author is memorable on at least two counts. Mr. Train is bold
in telling his readers (very few of them lawyers) that the business 'of law, if occasionally before juries and now and then in criminal court, involves also wills, contracts, securities and mortgages. And, in drawing on years in the courtroom and
law office - as he must have - he has had the candor to call his product fiction
rather than "trial tactics."
Thomas L. Shaffer
8 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 27.
11 Id. at 167.
12 Id. at 185.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Id. at 30.
15 Id. at 50.
16 Id. at 61.
17 Id. at 187,: "Pierson versus Post, 3 Caines Cases 175, if I remember correctly"; at
People versus McCallum, 103
174: "People versus Rogan, 223 Appellate Division 242 ....
New York 587."
18 Id. at 251: "Listen I'll read it to you. It's Section 305 of the Real Property Law: .... "
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